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SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27

TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)

SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
MEETING, FEBRUARY 26, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-090.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 26, 2010

Time: 10:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) During a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group meeting held at the Russian Mission on February 26, the sides discussed Part Four to the Annex on Inspection Activities, specifically, the Russian-proposed procedures for notification and agreement on changes to site diagrams. At the end of the meeting, there was a one-on-one meeting between Gen Orlov and Mr. Trout to discuss treaty provisions related to mobile missiles. End summary.

[1](#)4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Will These Weekend Meetings Solve Anything?; Changing Site Diagrams; Perceived Contradictions; A Thinner Main Operations Directorate; and Presidential No to Unique Mobile Treaty Provisions.

WILL THESE WEEKEND MEETINGS SOLVE ANYTHING?

15. (S) General Orlov asked about Mr. Trout's vision for future meetings. Trout proposed meetings take place immediately upon the return of the two delegations from the planned break. He was optimistic about the pending meeting of U/S Tauscher and Amb Antonov, saying that he hoped they could reach resolution on some of the larger issues. Orlov indicated he was unaware of the content of the discussion between the Presidents which had occurred two days prior, and that he hoped U/S Tauscher had the requisite authority to make definitive proposals. Trout assured Orlov that Tauscher had such authority and was bringing new guidance from Washington.

16. (S) Orlov expressed skepticism that anything productive could come from these meetings, recalling that the Presidents discussed such issues earlier in the week. Trout reiterated that U/S Tauscher flew to Geneva with new guidance to help negotiate the offense-defense relationship.

CHANGING SITE DIAGRAMS

17. (S) Orlov presented a Russian proposal for paragraphs 3-5 of Part Four to the Annex on Inspections and asked Col Petrov to explain the proposal and its underlying logic. Petrov said he had discussed his proposed procedures with the Russian officers and lawyers working on the Notifications Protocol and said he thought his proposal would be synchronous with the way the Notifications Working Group was thinking about the matter.

18. (S) In the Russian-proposed paragraph 3, Petrov proposed a special format for notification of the declaration of a new facility. He acknowledged that for 15 years under START, 48-hour notice for the declaration of a new facility and the exchange of the site diagram proved a successful procedure. However, said Petrov, a 72-hour timeframe was more practical for transmitting this notification and site diagram, given the extra time involved in transmitting the information through diplomatic channels. Petrov emphasized that diplomatic channels were a proven and practical means of transmitting this information, rather than waiting for the next meeting of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).

19. (S) For paragraph 4, Petrov proposed procedures for site diagram boundary changes which would not result in the exclusion of any part of the inspection site or coastlines and waters diagram, and for site diagram changes that entailed the addition or deletion of buildings depicted on a site diagram. For changes in the boundaries which preserve or increase the total bounded area, the change would occur on the date indicated in the notification and the new site diagram would be passed through diplomatic channels within 72 hours of the notification.

110. (S) For the addition or deletion of buildings which are

intended for use by items of inspection with no boundary change, a revised site diagram would be presented to the inspection team chief during pre-inspection procedures and would become part of the official inspection report.

¶11. (S) In the Russian-proposed paragraph 5, Petrov laid out two different procedures for boundary changes that entailed a decrease in any part of the inspection site. One scenario would involve a structure which is intended for items of inspection that is destroyed or dismantled. In this case, the inspected Party would provide a notification through diplomatic channels within 72 hours of the change. The change in the boundary of the inspection site would become effective on the date of transmission of the notification. The second scenario would involve a structure that

was depicted on an existing site diagram that was no longer intended for an item of inspection. In this case, the proposed change to the site diagram would be referred to the BCC for discussion between the Parties. If the Parties agreed upon the change, the new site diagram would be effective as of the date of transmission of the notification required by Part Four of the Protocol. This proposal did not specifically deal with boundary reductions that did not involve structures.

¶12. (S) Trout stated the United States looked forward to reviewing the proposal.

PERCEIVED CONTRADICTIONS

¶13. (S) Lobner and Col Pischulov turned to a few bracketed passages in Part Two of the Protocol that resulted from the conforming process. Lobner asked whether the Russian side had reconsidered the bracketed text in Section IV that listed unique identifiers (UIDs) for non-deployed SLBMs at a submarine base. Pischulov stated he now understood the U.S. concept behind this proposal, specifically, that the United States stored non-deployed SLBMs at the submarine base that were not located on the submarine. Based on that understanding, Russia dropped its brackets.

¶14. (S) Pischulov moved on to Section VI and asked whether the United States would accept the Russian proposal to use "or" instead of "and" to describe the category of non-deployed ICBMs/SLBMs at space launch facilities. Lobner explained that using "or" could result in a situation where, if both ICBMs and SLBMs were located at a space launch facility, a Party could interpret the "or" to mean that the Party was only required to declare one or the other, but not both. To avoid this ambiguity, he continued, "and" was the correct word to specify the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs. Pischulov disagreed because, he said, there are no space launch facilities that have both SLBMs and ICBMs. The text remained bracketed.

¶15. (S) Pischulov turned to his final question regarding UIDs in Section V, asking if the U.S. had accepted the Russian-proposal to list UIDs for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Trout explained that since a converted heavy bomber was no longer accountable under the treaty, the United States should not provide the UID.

¶16. (S) Orlov recounted the history of UIDs as he saw it. According to him, the United States originally insisted on UIDs. Then, he said, General Makarov was under great pressure to concede on this issue with Admiral Mullen sitting across from him. After

Makarov finally conceded on this issue, he explained to his nervous officers that he would paint the UIDs on heavy bombers in very small characters. Now, said Orlov, he would have to go back to Makarov and explain that although the United States forced Russia to concede on the UID issue, the United States now refused to place UIDs on a type of heavy bomber of an existing type, specifically the B-1B. Trout emphasized that once a heavy bomber had been converted there was no need for UIDs because there was no limit on the number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Orlov responded that UIDs on non-nuclear heavy bombers would help Russia determine that such heavy bombers had not been re-converted to heavy bombers equipped with nuclear armaments.

¶17. (S) Trout took the opportunity to attempt to explain the difference between "based" and "located" with reference to reporting on heavy bombers in the database. Orlov repeatedly said that he did not understand the value in differentiating between "located" and "based." Trout reminded Orlov that the Russian side refused to entertain the notion of a heavy bomber being "based" at a repair or production facility, and therefore, there was a need to differentiate between location and basing.

¶18. (S) Both sides used numerous examples to show how the numerical values for bombers would change as the bombers moved from air bases to certain types of facilities. Lobner emphasized that the numbers changed in one fashion when the bomber's location was the only factor taken into account, but could change in an entirely different way if the bomber's basing was the only factor taken into account. This duality, he argued, presented a difficult situation that needed a solution. The sides agreed that much work needed to be done on this Section. Trout indicated that the United States was working on a revised text for Section V and would hopefully be able to present the text at the beginning of the next session.

A THINNER MAIN OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

¶19. (S) Orlov mentioned twice that he was an officer of the Main Operations Directorate (Russian acronym: GOU) of the Russian General Staff and that he did not see the logic in many aspects of the formulation of this treaty. LTC Litterini remarked that he had worked as an assistant to a Russian general from GOU who worked at SHAPE, Belgium. Litterini asked Orlov to convey his regards to Generals Fillipovich and Ponomarenko. (Begin comment: FILLIPOVICH, Alexander Vasilyevich and PONOMARENKO, Andrei Makarovich. End comment.) Orlov said he knew both officers well, but that Ponomarenko had been discharged.

¶20. (S) In a side conversation, Pischulov noted that he personally was from GOU, and was a graduate of senior service college. Litterini commented that the Russian army was going through a

dramatic transition, and congratulated Pischulov in having survived the drawdown. Pischulov voiced great uncertainty due to the fact that he was here in Geneva while cuts were still occurring in Moscow. He said that he expected to work 13-hour days at GOU during the week-long break from negotiations in Geneva. He also noted that during the break at the New Year, GOU officers were

forced to work 13-hour days from January 2 until they returned to Geneva on January 30.

PRESIDENTIAL NO TO MOBILE PROVISIONS

¶21. (S) In a one-on-one meeting with Orlov, Trout explained the importance for the United States to include in the treaty the right to confirm the declared data for deployed mobile launchers at one ICBM basing area during a Type-1 inspection, and to have some reasonable boundary that Russia would declare for their road mobile ICBM bases. Orlov indicated that as a military man he could understand why the United States was requesting these treaty provisions. However, the President of Russia had insisted that there be no treaty provisions that uniquely applied to Russia's mobile ICBM forces. Given that Presidential order, no one in the Ministry of Defense or the delegation would be willing to sign a letter requesting the President change his mind. He emphasized that there was nothing anyone at our level of authority could do to change that ruling. He said it would take discussions between our Presidents to change the Russian delegation's instructions. He also noted that the Russian press had started calling the START Follow-on treaty "treacherous" to Russian national security. That made everyone even more nervous about recommending anything outside Presidential guidance.

¶22. (U) Documents provided:

- Russia:

-- Russian-Proposed Joint Draft Text for Paragraphs 3-5, Part Four to the Annex on Inspections (Russian-Language Version), dated February 26, 2010.

¶23. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Trout

LTC Litterini (RO)

LT Lobner

Mr. French (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov

Col Petrov

Col Pischulov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

[¶](#)24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING